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AESTHETIC JUDGMENT AND LEGAL
JUSTIFICATION
Guyora Binder
ABSTRACT
Although criticized as illegitimate, literary elements are necessary features
of legal argument. In a modern liberal state, law motivates compliance by
justifying controversial prescriptions as products of an appropriate process
for representing the will of society. Yet because law constructs the will of
individual and collective actors in representing them, its representations are
necessarily figurative rather than mimetic. In evaluating law’s
representation of society, citizens of the liberal state are also shaping their
own ends. Such self-expressive choices, subjective but non-instrumental,
entail aesthetic judgment. Thus the literary elements of rhetorical figuration
and aesthetic appeal are fundamental, rather than merely ornamental, to
legal justification.

In the modern liberal state, law is seen as legitimate in so far as it successfully
represents popular and individual will. Liberal legal thought tends to equate law’s
legitimacy with the objectivity and mimetic accuracy of this representation. Thus,
law achieves legitimacy by fulfiling democratic will, satisfying preferences, or
protecting rights.
Critics of liberal legal thought often respond that law is illegitimate because (1)
it does not achieve its claimed objectivity or because (2) its formality precludes it
from fully and authentically representing the subjectivity of society’s members.
In making these arguments, critics of liberal legal thought deploy the analogy of
law to literature in antithetical ways. Thus, critiques of the first kind insist that
law is too literary – that is, too figurative and imaginative to represent objectively.
Critiques of the second kind, however, charge that law is not literary enough –
that is, insufficiently sensitive and expressive to represent authentically. Both of
these arguments treat the literary as an anomaly within law, although for different
reasons. The first critique accepts the modern liberal state’s aspiration to represent
society objectively, and berates it for falling short of this ideal. The second
critique presumes the modern liberal state’s success in achieving objectivity, but
rejects this standard of mimesis in favor of authenticity. Both accept the liberal
premise that law should accurately reflect society in its deliberations and
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decisions, without changing society. Each criticizes part of modern liberal legal
thought’s program of objective representation, at the price of endorsing the
remainder.
Drawing on pragmatic epistemology, post-structuralist literary theory, and
institutionalist critiques of rational choice theory, this chapter rejects liberal legal
thought’s aspiration to mimetic accuracy. Moreover, it rejects both forms of
criticism as expressions of the same flawed aspiration. It treats the charge that law
is insufficiently objective as a form of skepticism, and treats the complaint that
law effaces authentic subjectivity as a form of sentimentalism. Both critiques are
unpragmatic, demanding of law what it cannot possibly – and should not aspire to
– deliver. Rather than evaluating law as a mimetic representation of society, this
chapter reinterprets law’s allocation of decisionmaking authority as a necessarily
figurative and constructive representation of society’s will. It understands legal
argument to make a rhetorical appeal to aesthetic judgment rather than an
empirical claim to mimetic accuracy. And it treats the larger question of the legal
system’s legitimacy as a similarly aesthetic question of expressive validity. Thus,
rather than treating the literary as anomalous within law, this chapter treats the
literary as inherent in the construction and operation of legal authority.
Like much imaginative literature, law represents subjectivities and their desires.
But, also like these types of literature, law’s relationship to what it represents is
figurative and performative rather than straightforwardly mimetic. Law constructs
subjectivities in the process of representing them. In this way it composes and
portrays the characters on which it relies for its authority. On this view, legal
systems should be judged as much on the basis of the desires and characters they
cultivate as on the basis of their efficiency in gratifying those desires or their
accuracy in representing those characters. Law’s portrayal of society is ‘‘true’’
only in so far as we choose to make it so by identifying ourselves with it. Thus
legitimacy involves a performative element, depending on the commitment of
those who choose to identify with the law. Law can never simply reflect our
authentic selves. Instead, it enables us to express ourselves in certain ways, and
thereby precludes us from expressing ourselves in other ways. The question of
who we should become is neither simply a question of ethical duty nor an arbitrary
matter of consumer choice. Democratic self-fashioning poses value questions, but
these value questions call for aesthetic judgment.
One of my aims in laying out this aesthetic account of legal authority is to
clarify the conceptual architecture of my book written with Bob Weisberg,
Literary Criticisms of Law (Binder & Weisberg, 2000). The book reviewed and
critiqued the emergent law and literature scholarship of the late twentieth century.
It incorporated our earlier article ‘‘Cultural Criticism of Law’’ (Binder &
Weisberg, 1997), and drew on other work of ours, including Bob’s well-known
article ‘‘The Law-Literature Enterprise’’ (Weisberg, 1988). Threaded through
Literary Criticisms of Law was an argument that, (1) in the modern liberal state,
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law represents society rhetorically rather than mimetically and (2) the authority of
law and the validity of particular legal arguments depend upon aesthetic
judgment. In reviewing law and literature scholarship in that volume, we had two
aims. One was to collect and explicate works that revealed law’s rhetorical and
aesthetic dimensions. The other was to expose and critique the skeptical or
sentimental premises of much law and literature scholarship. This chapter
explicates the critical perspective developed in Literary Criticisms of Law, but
does not attempt to illustrate or apply that perspective. It does not address the state
of law and literature scholarship because what I have to say on that subject, I have
said.
My account of the role of the literary in legal authority will proceed as follows.
First, I will develop and explain a conception of literature as rhetorical (i.e.
figurative) discourse presented for aesthetic judgment. Second, I will offer a
conception of law as a relatively coercive, formal, and justificatory institution. In
so doing, I will contrast two models of justification within such an institution: a
modernist model that seeks foundations in physiological or psychological facts,
and a pragmatist model that tests claims by their implications for practice and
evaluates these implications aesthetically. Third, I will offer an account of legal
argument as a rhetoric offering narratively structured figurative representations of
subjectivity for aesthetic judgment and expressive identification. Finally, I will
characterize the skeptical and sentimental critiques of law as expressions of legal
modernism and urge that legal justification be accepted as a pragmatic discourse
which necessarily employs the literary elements of rhetorical representation and
aesthetic judgment.

1.
LITERARY DISCOURSE AND AESTHETIC
JUDGMENT
Let us define literature as any kind of discourse that presents figurative
representations or ‘‘rhetoric’’ for aesthetic judgment. Using such a conception,
we can identify and analyze literary elements in many kinds of cultural practices,
including law.
By figurative or rhetorical language, I mean language that is not purely
propositional. Rhetoric refers obliquely, substituting one proposition or other
verbal sign for another, rather than substituting a proposition for a state of affairs
or a set of sense data. An important claim of post-structuralist literary theory is
that all language is figurative. This claim rests on ideas drawn from structuralist
linguistics and pragmatist philosophy of language. Structuralism treats language
as an organization of the experienced world rather than a set of labels for
prelinguistic objects or sensations. On the structuralist view signs are given their
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meanings not by the sense-experience they organize, but instead by their relations
to and differences from other signs within a system (de Saussure, 1959; Culler,
1975). In this sense, every proposition is a trope, evoking all the other propositions
it differs from.
Pragmatist philosophy of language shares the premise that thought apprehends
the world through language (Peirce, 1931–1935). It holds that scientific data, for
example, must be identified and recorded in a language laden with theoretical
assumptions (Quine, 1963; Rorty, 1979). In contrast to structuralism, however,
pragmatism envisions language as an evolving practice rather than a stable
structure. On this view, the meaning of any utterance is its use – the actions and
utterances to which it responds, and which predictably follow it. Because verbal
meaning is merely customary, subject to evolving patterns of use, the concepts
that organize thought can have no stable essence. Utterances are moves in a
‘‘language game’’ with no predetermined outcome (Wittgenstein, 1968). Such a
game presupposes that interlocutors are bound together by activities and
institutions; but as the practical context for speech changes and as players respond
to utterances in surprising ways, the use and meaning of particular sentences
change. Thus every utterance differs not only from other words that might be said
on this occasion, but also from the same words that might have been said on
previous occasions, but with a different meaning (Hurley, 1989). This temporal
differentiation means that every time we speak we are reusing past utterances to
stand for new propositions, with open-ended meanings. For post-structuralists this
constant reuse of language in an always-different context is a substitution of one
sign for another, so that all utterances are rhetorical figures that invite the hearer
to interpret an indeterminate meaning (Binder & Weisberg, 2000; Derrida, 1976;
Culler, 1983). The contingency of meaning on the responses of others makes
every move in a language game a gamble, requiring what legal theorist Karl
Llewllyn called ‘‘situation-sense,’’ a kind of interpretive judgment and gestural
grace (Llewellyn, 1960, pp. 60–61).
This view of language as inevitably instable and rhetorical has some fairly
straightforward implications for law. Thus, it suggests we are unlikely to control
official discretion, or to secure a stable, predictable environment for individual
choice, merely by issuing detailed rules (Tushnet, 1988; Levinson, 1988; Lieber,
1839). The qualities of regularity and predictability are not relations of
correspondence between prescribed and achieved states of affairs, but instead are
feelings that officials have used language and exercised choice in tolerably
legitimate ways. Such a feeling is likely to depend on a relatively peaceable
context without rapid changes in social status or social norms. In other words
stable social practices make it possible to ‘‘follow rules,’’ rather than the other
way around (Fish, 1989). More importantly, the feeling of regularity is not the
product simply of observation or measurement, but of a necessarily subjective and
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evaluative judgment on the part of some socially situated observer. This is an
ultimately aesthetic judgment about the way that officials perform their roles.
If all speech is rhetorical, any speech can function as literature – can have
literary meaning – in so far as it is subjected to aesthetic judgment. By aesthetic
judgment I mean a conception developed by Kant in the Critique of Judgment,
considered the foundation of the modern field of aesthetics (Kant, 1986). Kant
took the appreciation of art as the paradigm for aesthetic judgment, but did not
limit the concept to such judgments. According to his conception, aesthetic
evaluation requires a subjective, concrete, disinterested, judgment of intrinsic
value. For Kant, a judgment was an evaluation subject to discursive contestation
and justification. Kant certainly did not agree that there is no disputing taste: in
principle, one should be able to offer persuasive reasons for an aesthetic judgment,
supported by invoking an interlocutor’s experience of the sensuous qualities of
the object being judged. Yet, neither could logic or empirical evidence ever prove
an aesthetic evaluation, or finally settle an aesthetic dispute. Thus aesthetic
judgments are subjective rather than objective: they are not determined by logic
or by characteristics of the object judged. Ultimately, each individual must be the
judge of his or her own aesthetic experience.
An aesthetic judgment is concrete in the sense that it is a judgment of a
particular object, unmediated by any concept, rule, or general criterion. Joseph
Heller’s Something Happened is a fine novel, not because it exemplifies the
praiseworthy quality of suspense, but because of the particular way it wrings
suspense out of the prosaic details of middle-class family life, as revealed by a
narrative speaker determined to keep his anxieties hidden from himself. Thus, the
particular way that suspense is expressed in this novel is aesthetically valuable
because of its contribution to the novel’s unique formal structure. For Kant, the
concreteness of aesthetic evaluation distinguishes it from moral evaluation, which
measures every action by the same general standard of fairness.
An aesthetic judgment is disinterested in the sense that it is not – although it
may accompany – the experience of pleasure. Thus, a tragedy can impress me as
great while overwhelming me with sadness; by contrast, a formulaic potboiler
might give me just what I want, without impressing me at all. In Something
Happened, the reader’s eager curiosity is an integral formal element, but so is the
reader’s dread and discomfort. Particular pleasures may be necessary means to
achieve particular aesthetic effects, but the value of such an effect is not reducible
to the pleasure producing it. Finally, according to Kant’s conception, an aesthetic
judgment is a judgment of intrinsic rather than instrumental value. A work of art
is not beautiful or great because it causes pleasure, or any other good consequence.
It might teach moral virtues, or give insight into human psychology, but such
beneficial consequences are distinct from its aesthetic value.
Aesthetic judgment plays a role in artistic expression and in the appreciation
and criticism of artistic works. Just as the creation of art cannot be reduced to a
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formula, art criticism does not apply general standards of value given in advance
of the act of aesthetic judgment. Instead, it informs experience of the object of
aesthetic judgment, in such a way as to create a shared or reproducible experience.
To the extent that the shared experience made available by a critical interpretation
impresses its audience as intrinsically valuable, it becomes possible to derive
criteria of value from that shared experience. Aesthetic criticism identifies values
expressed by human creations and judges those values on the basis of the shared
experience of those creations. Thus, aesthetic criticism is less concerned with
applying evaluative standards than with identifying, developing, and assessing
values.
Aesthetic judgment can play a role in other kinds of evaluative decisionmaking
as well. It is relevant whenever a decisionmaker has a measure of discretion, yet
is not simply gratifying her own desires. Typically, this sort of evaluative decision
will arise in collective action, which often requires interpreting norms or
representing others’ interests. Thus, when acting for an organization with an
indefinite purpose or multiple purposes, a decisionmaker has to construct the
organization’s mission in order to serve it. Particularly if the organization depends
on the voluntary cooperation of its agents, the decisionmaker must act in a way
that will be accepted by others as a coherent interpretation of the organization’s
past practices and of the participants’ community of interest. One who acts for
another as a fiduciary rather than an agent often has discretion to interpret the
beneficiary’s interests, but cannot simply replace those interests with her own. In
these situations of interpretation and representation, choice involves judgment
rather than preference, and that judgment is partly aesthetic (Simon, 1978; Luban,
1988).
Ronald Dworkin has noted a similarly constructive element inherent in
applying customary norms such as courtesy that require adapting conventions to
changing social circumstances. Dworkin views this kind of ‘‘constructive
interpretation’’ of an existing social practice as an exercise of aesthetic judgment
(Dworkin, 1986). Pierre Bourdieu has identified an analogous combination of
discretion and constrained judgment in the related social practice of giftexchange. A well-chosen gift should express something about the giver and the
receiver; it should differ from the receiver’s past gifts to the giver, and yet
symbolically equal or requite them (Bourdieu, 1990). The expression of courtesy
is an aesthetic effect, but that does not mean it is merely ornamental. Tact
facilitates trust, enabling strangers or rivals to achieve the mutual benefits of
otherwise ‘‘irrational’’ cooperation. A British diplomat assigned to the Coalition
Provisional Authority in occupied Iraq learned that ‘‘a cup of coffee delivered in
the right way could win more friends than a new high school, and no amount of
money could wipe clean an insult.’’ The relationships with tribal leaders he built
on this sort of courtesy enabled him ‘‘to secure the release of a British

This article is © Emerald Publishing Limited and permission has been granted for this version
to appear here (https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu). Emerald does not grant permission
for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express
permission from Emerald Publishing Limited.

7

businessman,yhanded back to him as a ‘present’ from the uncle of the kidnapper’’
(Skidelsky, 2006, p. 12).
Aesthetic judgment is also required in making decisions about the cultivation
of tastes, whether for one’s self or another. When parents choose educational
environments for a child they are acting as fiduciaries. Hopefully they are acting
in the ‘‘best’’ interests of the child rather than simply gratifying their own
preferences by unreflectively reproducing themselves or compensating for their
own disappointments. Nor would we expect them merely to gratify the current
preferences of the child (to do nothing but watch TV for example), who is not yet
competent to formulate her own purposes without assistance. The parents are
acting in part to determine the preferences and interests of the child by developing
her character (Margulies, 1996, p. 1475). The interests that are ‘‘best’’ for this
particular child in the long run, in the judgment of those who love and care for
her, are interests she does not yet have and perhaps never would develop if raised
by different parents with different capabilities and interests. Exercising such
judgment is a profoundly serious responsibility, but it is nevertheless at least in
part, an aesthetic choice: subjective, disinterested, informed by judgments of
intrinsic worth (‘‘best’’), but also highly contingent and concrete (what are this
child and these parents capable of under these circumstances?).
Similarly, when a young adult makes important decisions with long-term
consequences for herself – going to Antioch, entering the military or holy orders,
emigrating, getting married, having a child – she is not gratifying her future
preferences because those future preferences depend, in large part, on her choices.
These kinds of identity-altering choices are better seen as selfexpressive or selffashioning than as self-gratifying. Such choices about what kind of person one
would like to become are aesthetic choices in so far as they reflect judgment of
what available or achievable roles, interests, and desires are most worthy, or will
best realize one’s particular potential. The problem of character development that
preoccupies modern fiction, drama, and lyric poetry is the problem that confronts
us individually and collectively in a liberal society where we are free to define
and develop our own virtues, free to – in Nietzsche’s telling phrase – ‘‘give style’’
to our characters (Nietzsche, 1974, pp. 185–186; Nehamas, 1985). Imaginative
literature engages our aesthetic judgment in this problem, and trains it; but
planning the development of character is a problem we face in ‘‘real’’ life.
Following Kant, many thinkers have explored the role of these kinds of
aesthetic judgments in politics and law. The poet Friedrich Schiller argued in his
Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man that aesthetic experience was essential
preparation for exercising the moral and civic obligations associated with freedom
in the new democratic state. Deliberating about and cooperating to achieve the
public good required training in empathetic imagination and disinterested
evaluation. What would it feel like to be somebody else? What would society be
like to live in after this or that legislative change? For Schiller, aesthetic
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appreciation was also a kind of motivation necessary for compliance with moral
and civic obligation. The creation of a good society, like the creation of art, could
become a gratifying calling (Schiller, 1967). Hannah Arendt, in her lectures on
Kant’s Critique of Judgment, agreed that political persuasion among equals
necessarily involves an aesthetic appeal. Democratic politics, for Arendt, is
deliberative and transformative: if participants are unwilling to examine and alter
their own preferences and identify with collective projects they are merely
engaged in bargaining, not politics. Thus a legitimate law does not represent the
electorate by reflecting the preferences of a majority of individuals. Instead it
constitutes a figurative representation of a collective will that can only come into
existence in the deliberative process and through collective action (Arendt, 1992).
Juergen Habermas’s neo-Kantian ethical theory treats a deliberative discourse
of instrumental and aesthetic evaluation as an indispensable legitimating
condition for any legal or political arrangement. Drawing also on pragmatic
epistemology, Habermas associates modern rationality with an open-ended
process of testing belief, responsive not only to new evidence, but also to new
conditions and purposes. For Habermas, deliberation unrestricted by a given end,
concept, or object is the condition for justifying propositions in a self-governing
society of equals. Habermas sees propositions of any kind as part of an
institutional practice of language rather than as copies of sensory experience.
Hence their validity is always provisional, dependent on ongoing social practices
of evaluation and reason-giving rather than correspondence with objects or
concepts. These provisional judgments of legitimacy are partly instrumental
because they permit the invocation of those social purposes and practices on
which interlocutors can agree. But in so far as those purposes and practices are
themselves subject to challenge, interpretation, and revision, judgments of
legitimacy are also aesthetic in part. Habermas’s major work on legal theory,
Between Facts and Norms, emphasizes the interpretive character of deliberation
about law. Legal institutions and rules always have an arbitrary, historically
contingent character, or ‘‘facticity.’’ We tend to accept historically received laws
provisionally because by establishing a modicum of social order and peace they
facilitate collective action, including the justificatory deliberation that is the
condition of legitimacy. The price of this provisional acceptance is the
hermeneutic character of legal deliberation, the necessarily imaginative project of
making normative sense of historical contingency (Habermas, 1996).
Habermas’s reflections on law’s historicity or ‘‘facticity’’ respond to two
leading post-war hermeneutic theorists of law, Hans-Georg Gadamer and
Dworkin. Both argued that legal interpretation was a creative process implicating
aesthetic judgment. Gadamer, in Truth and Method, portrayed interpretation of all
kinds as a dialogue between text and interpreter in which the interpreter comes to
understand herself as a participant in an enabling language and culture rather than
a self-determining instrumental actor (Gadamer, 1975). The legal interpreter
This article is © Emerald Publishing Limited and permission has been granted for this version
to appear here (https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu). Emerald does not grant permission
for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express
permission from Emerald Publishing Limited.

9

comes to understand the historically contingent legal text as not arbitrary for her,
by developing a self-interpretation as a participant in an institutional tradition that
generated the text and that enables judgments of meaning and value. Even the
interpreter’s capacity to criticize existing legal arrangements draws upon a
language, society, and history that also gave rise to those arrangements. To protest
is to presume that the legal system is at some level bound by the values the
protester invokes, so that the legal discourse always contains the germ of its own
creative transformation. But that transformation depends on acts of creative selffashioning by interpreters implicated in that discourse. Dworkin, in Law’s Empire,
offers a similar account of legal reasoning and argument as engaged participation
in a legal system, in which a ‘‘constructive interpreter’’ makes sense of received
legal materials by imagining the underlying purposes and principles of justice that
make the ‘‘best’’ of them. Dworkin calls the hermeneutic obligation to make the
best of law ‘‘the aesthetic hypothesis.’’ And he likens the interpretive process to
reading a legal system’s past as the actions of a fictional person and continuing
the story in a way that maintains that character’s ‘‘integrity’’ in both the aesthetic
and the moral senses of that term (Dworkin, 1986).
These thinkers see aesthetic judgment as part of law and politics because they
see law and politics as settings for collective self-fashioning. They see political
and legal legitimacy as an aesthetic effect, a value judgment that persuades
individuals to identify themselves with a particular, historically contingent set of
social arrangements and to embrace purposes that are not their own. In developing
a conception of law as an object of literary analysis, then, we want to emphasize
the role of figurative representations in legitimating law by persuading law’s
subjects to identify with it, or at least to identify themselves in the terms law
provides.

2. LEGAL INSTITUTIONS
In recent decades, social scientists in various fields have developed the concept
of institutions to capture the causal role of a variety of factors left out of rational
choice models of society. These include cultural meanings and values, but also
routines and procedures for gathering and processing information, and for
allocating decisionmaking authority. The juxtaposition of such seemingly
disparate phenomena in the same category suggests surprising connections among
them. Thus, for example, we can think of decisionmaking procedures as semiotic
relations, in which person A is authorized to decide or act on behalf of person B
or organization C; or in which facts D and E are taken as conclusive evidence of
quality F. Similarly, we can conceive of virtues and value commitments as the
performance of roles, such as the good Catholic, the neutral judge, or the obedient
soldier. On this view, persons acting out value commitments serve as symbols,
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standing for something beyond their own preferences. Because institutionalism
presents both substantive and procedural norms as semiotic relations involving a
kind of representation, it offers a perspective that may illuminate law’s literary
aspect.
Drawing on the institutionalist literature, we may define institutions as social
practices organizing collective action through a discourse that classifies situations
as subject to rules or other normative standards. Thus defined, institutions have a
normative dimension, involving rule-following; a semiotic dimension, concerned
with representing situations as instances of a class; and a social dimension,
involving organization for collective action. Institutions sometimes also have a
political dimension, concerned with the distribution of authority to make and
apply normative judgments, and the distribution of responsibility to follow norms.
Thus, institutions frequently classify persons as well as situations and apply so
condition the application of normative standards on particular roles or statuses
(MacCormick & Weinberger, 1986; March & Olsen, 1989; North, 1990; Peters,
1999; Ruiter, 1993; Scott, 1995; Searle, 1995). Institutions include almost any
socially organized activity, such as science or art. Language, which organizes
collective action through conventional representations that are subject to
normative standards of referential and grammatical correctness, is an institution
on which most other institutions depend. Money, a system of rules for
representing exchange value, that facilitates exchange and resource allocation, is
also an institution.
Given a conception of an institution as a practice of using norms to organize
collective action, we can define law as including any institution that is relatively
coercive, formal, and articulate. So legal institutions involve norms of conduct
understood, in principle, to be binding on persons recognized as occupying certain
statuses, whether or not those individuals accept those obligations. These conduct
norms are backed by sanctions, imposed by some persons at the request of others,
according to norms of participation, investigative procedure, decision, and
discursive justification.
Finally, the process of generating all these norms is governed by additional norms
of participation, procedure, and discursive justification (Komesar, 1997; Hart,
1994). The formality of law consists in the prevalence of norms of participation
and procedure in the discourse of legal justification. Most legal questions are
resolved by identifying the authoritative decisionmaker, the past decisions of such
an actor, or the standards authorized by such an actor, rather than by directly
invoking values or goals.
To characterize law as an institution is to say that it conditions participation on
the acceptance of norms and the performance of roles. Institutional roles channel
action by supplying actors with a set of motives, concerns, and assumptions and
a limited repertoire of behaviors. Roles render action intelligible and predictable
to others (Bourdieu, 1991; Bourdieu, 1977; Binder & Weisberg, 1997). The
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desires to communicate to others or to be associated with certain roles can
therefore motivate compliance with norms. In other words, people can comply
with norms out of expressive rather than instrumental motives.
As an institutional practice, then, law commands not only or ultimately by
threatening. Law orders society through the combined effects of coercive force
and normative authority. Norms without force are not laws, but commands are not
laws unless they are obeyed also out of a sense of obligation. Moreover, law’s
force and its authority are integrally connected. On the one hand, law can muster
manpower and weapons only because many people agree that its commands
should be obeyed. On the other hand, the availability of coercive force enhances
law’s authority. Because many will prefer any effective legal system, however
unjust, to anarchy or violent civil conflict, force tends to generate its own
legitimacy. To view law as an institution, however, is to emphasize the role of
law’s normative authority in inducing compliance and legitimizing state force.
That authority is a cultural construct, real in so far as people believe it to be so.
The authority of many institutions is a matter of unreflective habit. We usually
accept money as valuable and language as meaningful without reflecting about
how and why this is so. But law is different, at least in modern liberal states. Law
is an arena of contestation and legal authority depends upon a self-conscious
discourse of justification. In making legal arguments, participants of course try to
establish the validity of particular propositions of law. Yet in so doing they also
endorse the authority of law generally, warranting the rationality of the forum in
which they appear, the validity of the statutes, prior cases and principles they cite,
and the legitimacy of the process that generated these sources of law.
A practical incentive to justify arises only when we need to – and can hope to
– influence the behavior of others with some power to withhold cooperation. We
justify actions and beliefs where contestation is possible but there are nevertheless
common norms to appeal to. Thus, a discourse of justification is most likely in
institutional settings characterized by a relative equality among participants, and
a measure of freedom of action. Indeed, we may say that a distinctive
characteristic of modern liberal societies is the proliferation of justificatory
practices that presuppose this kind of freedom and equality. Justificatory
discourse in such a society usually involves more than invocation of hierarchical
status or tradition (Ackerman, 1980). Law, with its self-conscious discourse of
justification, becomes a paradigm for other modes of institutional authority in
such a society.
Let us define modernity as a discursive situation premised on the
epistemological principle that all knowledge must derive from human experience
or reason, rather than tradition or faith; and the meta-ethical principle that all value
must derive from human will or reason, rather than tradition or faith (Patterson,
1996; Lyotard, 1984). Modernity gives rise to the practice of modernist criticism,
which tests beliefs by reducing them to their foundations in sensation, will, and
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reason. In the field of law, such reductionist movements as utilitarianism, legal
positivism, legal science, legal realism, critical legal studies, and law and
economics have exemplified modernist criticism (Bentham, 1996; Austin, 1873;
Williston, 1920; Cohen, 1935; Singer, 1984; Posner, 1973).
Modernity shapes justificatory discourses as responses to modernist criticism.
In the face of normative disagreement, modernist justificatory discourse has a
tendency to discount reason and to root values entirely in some form of will or
desire. Justificatory reference to desire may be teleological (interests, utility,
welfare, needs), or archaeological (consent, preferences, injuries). Reason (or
‘‘rationality’’) may then be accorded a subordinate role in directing action to serve
desire, or in reconciling conflicting desires through deliberation or aggregation.
These variants of modernist justificatory discourse share a common assumption:
that practices can only be justified by correspondence to observed fact. This
insistence on a foundation in fact arises from modernism’s mistrust of the
discourses of representation on which institutional practices depend. Modernist
criticism treats the need for representation as an embarrassment. Thus, it strives
to reduce these representations, or signs, to the ‘‘reality’’ they represent – ideas,
sense impressions, desires, intentions, verbal meanings, material interests,
behavior, and so forth. From this perspective, representations have meaning or
value by virtue of their correspondence to some state of affairs. In short modernist
criticism presumes that representation has a mimetic function (Patterson, 1996;
Ankersmit, 1996).
In epistemology, modernist criticism asks ‘‘what is it about the world that our
statements must conform to, to make them true?’’ In philosophy of language, it
asks ‘‘what must a claim about the meaning of language correspond to, to make
it true?’’ Philosophers’ answers to these questions have generally taken the form
of an intelligible essence, or some similar mental entity. Thus, rationalists held
that knowledge was founded on clear and distinct ideas. Empiricists complained
that these ideas were unobservable specters, and replaced them with sense
impressions and mental associations. As pragmatists pointed out, however,
empiricists thereby reproduced the idealism for which they had criticized the
rationalists. Empiricists assumed we could only understand, use, and
communicate about our environment if it came equipped with mental handles for
words to grasp onto (Rorty, 1979). As argued in the preceding section, however,
this idea of a direct linkage between words and features of the world
mischaracterizes how we use language. Linguistic and literary structuralists have
pointed out that signifieds, what words denote or connote, are linguistic
constructs, no less dependent on a system of conventional signs than are their
verbal signifiers (Binder & Weisberg, 2000). Pragmatic philosophers of language
and literary post-structuralists have converged on the view that these signifieds
are shifting webs of association rather than hard-edged concepts or categories.
The meaning of any term is hostage to the evolving history of its use. Because no
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two occasions of use are identical, every use of language is rhetorically figurative,
and every act of communication or interpretation is a speculative move in a
language game (Wittgenstein, 1968; Hurley, 1989; Derrida, 1976; Binder &
Weisberg, 2000). Every classificatory judgment is a normative claim within an
institutional practice that may be accepted, rejected, or reinterpreted by others.
Pragmatism takes the failure of philosophy’s varied attempts to translate
language and thought into unmediated reality, as evidence that the task should be
abandoned. Pragmatism therefore rejects the assumption that representation must
stand in a relation of correspondence with the world, in order to be meaningful
(Rorty, 1979). Instead, pragmatism views representations simply as tools for
organizing social practices, and holds that their necessarily unstable meaning
inheres in their use. Since the same utterances can be used by both speakers and
hearers, by multiple authors and later by different readers, there is never any single
spatial and temporal locus of meaning, no ultimate authority on what any
utterance means. Representation, in the sense used here – the use of signs within
an institutional practice – is never purely mimetic. It is always figurative and
always offered for normative judgment.
The disagreement between modernism and pragmatism about representation
extends to the special case of political representation. Political representation is a
form of collective action involving (1) a division of labor that allocates power to
persons acting in designated roles to promulgate or apply norms backed by
coercive sanctions and (2) a justificatory discourse ascribing these exercises of
power to others. Persons may be represented by particular other persons, or by
organizations, within which different persons may have different roles
(Ankersmit,1996; Pitkin, 1967). Political representation is a common institutional
structure in modern legal systems, and the justificatory discourse of political
representation is an important source of legal argument.
Just as modernist epistemology and philosophy of language have looked for a
third term to explain how representations can correspond to what they represent,
modernist political theory has done the same. Political theory asks what about us
political institutions must represent to make their representation legitimate. The
answers – preferences, interests, opinions, convictions – purport to be
psychological facts about persons. But like any other signified, these objects of
representation depend upon the system of signs that differentiates them from other
signifieds (Ankersmit, 1996; Hurley, 1989). Thus, we need an agenda, a menu of
options, in order to have an opinion. We need issues, establishing political axes,
before we can locate our political positions on those axes (Pildes & Anderson,
1990; Mackie, 2003). In this sense, the political preferences electoral and
legislative institutions represent are ‘‘endogenous’’ to those institutions (Hurley,
1989; March & Olsen, 1995; Green & Shapiro, 1994). Political representations,
therefore, cannot correspond to social fact. They cannot achieve mimetic truth.
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They must win normative acceptance from those they represent on some other
basis.
Based on its view of representation as inherently rhetorical, pragmatism also
offers an account of both cognitive and evaluative justification that rejects the
mimetic premise of modernism. Pragmatic justification makes the test of any
action or belief the difference it makes in practice. It asks us to compare the
consequences of any action or claim with the consequences of available
alternative actions or claims. But unlike other consequentialist doctrines, such as
utilitarian policy analysis or verificationist epistemology, pragmatism does not
prescribe further criteria for comparing alternative bundles of consequences. It
treats the justification of action and belief as a matter of situated practical
judgment, and denies that justification must rest on a foundation of indubitable
knowledge (Rorty, 1979; Patterson, 1996; Herzog, 1985; Binder, 2001).
Aesthetic judgment has a special role to play in the consequentialist evaluation
required in pragmatist justification. Pragmatism asks us to evaluate consequences
without the metric provided by some foundational standard of value. It is tempting
to assume that this means we should simply assess consequences instrumentally,
by reference to the purposes we already have. But this evades such questions as
what feasible choices we have among purposes, what the consequences would be
of choosing different purposes, whether those consequences would be better or
worse, and from what perspective. We cannot employ instrumental reason to
evaluate ends: this is a question of aesthetic judgment (Binder, 2001). Thus, in so
far as legal justification is pragmatist rather than modernist, it will involve a
rhetorical appeal to aesthetic judgment.

3. THE RHETORIC OF LEGAL JUSTIFICATION
Legal justification is a rhetoric that makes an aesthetic appeal. It combines three
types of rhetorical figures. The most important of these is the political
representation of subjective will. In a modern liberal state, law is seen as a human
creation, designed to serve human needs (Cardozo, 1921). Accordingly, law’s
content is justified by reference to the utility or choice of human beings or their
institutional representations. Legal argument and decision therefore involve
prospective reasoning about the interests of persons, groups, populations,
institutions, and polities; and retrospective reasoning about the content and
competence of their choices. In other words, almost all legal argument is about
the desires of legal actors, how best to measure, identify, or represent those
desires, and whose desires should count (Binder & Weisberg, 1997; Binder,
2001).
These political representations of subjective will are framed by three forms of
narratives: narratives of reconciliation, narratives of authorization, and narratives
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of legitimation. Narratives of reconciliation are the rhetorical structures used to
explain how the will of each becomes the will of all. Thus, they explain how the
invisible hand of the market reconciles the competing desires of consumers into
efficient allocations of resources; or how political processes organize the
incommensurable preferences of voters into a coherent popular will; or how wise
judges rationally reconcile the competing liberty claims of litigants. In other
words, narratives of reconciliation warrant particular decisionmaking procedures
as methods for representing society as a whole. Narratives of authorization link a
particular act to the will of all, in the form of a past authoritative decision or a
future societal goal. Finally, narratives of legitimation warrant the subjective will
of society itself as an authoritative source of law by linking it to some greater
source of virtue in the past or future.
‘‘Narrative’’ refers to the recounting of a story, a chronological sequence of
causally linked events in the experience of a human or anthropomorphized
subject. A narrative is a kind of rhetorical trope, a structure of meaning imposed
on events by their selection, ordering, and telling. It begins in equilibrium,
presenting a stable routine of behaviors and roles. This equilibrium is then
disturbed by some conflict, often between the subject and forces external to it,
which disrupts routines and roles, opening new possibilities. The story ends in a
new state of equilibrium (Binder & Weisberg, 2000; Winter, 1989; Scholes &
Kellogg, 1966; Todorov, 1971). The mediation of such a story by a teller rather
than performers distinguishes narrative from drama, but both are mediations
distinct from events themselves (Scholes & Kellogg, 1966). In modern culture,
the activity of a narrator alerts an audience to the artifactual or subjectively
constructed quality of the story, even when the resulting narrative is nonfictional
(Binder & Weisberg, 2000).
Narrative, like drama, makes a sensuous appeal to an audience’s judgment by
creating the aesthetic quality of suspense. It evokes tension by describing
disequilibrium, and suspends that tension by recounting events in a temporal
order. The narrator promises to resolve that tension if only the reader will patiently
continue a little longer. Thus the act of reading narrative commits the reader to a
kind of contract, which invests the reader in accepting the resolution, when it
comes, as appropriate and satisfying (Sussman, 1998; Brooks, 1996). Despite
narrative’s predictable form, it must be unpredictable in the details to achieve the
necessary aesthetic qualities of suspense and surprised relief. In this sense it
invites the reader to engage in the particularistic judgment characteristic of
aesthetic experience generally.
Narrative has always been involved in the legitimation of normative orders
(Cover, 1983; Lyotard, 1984; MacIntyre, 1985). This is obvious in preliterate
societies, which can only record and transmit their norms and political institutions
in the form of memorable stories. But literacy begins with the transcription of
these national or tribal epics. In modern society, such epics have been replaced
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with more specialized discourses: narrative histories to record the origins and
development of political institutions, narrative novels and memoirs to recount the
interaction of character and role, and non-narrative law codes to fix norms and
procedures. Yet these functionally distinct and formally disparate genres
presuppose one another. Modern law tends to be seen as entrenching two large
institutional structures: a more or less democratic nation state and a civil society
of transacting individuals. The national history underwrites the first, by grounding
an argument that law has organized a population into a political community
capable of conferring its consent to governance (White, 1981; Bhaba, 1990). The
novel and memoir underwrite the second, by warranting that the individual is
capable of rationally and responsibly exercising the discretion inherent in legal
personality (Gagnier, 1987; Gallagher, 1994; Lukacs, 1920; Lynch, 1998). At the
same time, law gives these genres their subjects, organizing the polities whose
careers are recounted in history, and the civil societies within which novelistic
characters pursue their careers of romance, intrigue, and social climbing.
Authorization narratives play an essential role in law’s justificatory discourse.
The very concept of sanction involves the structure of a story, triggered by some
deviation from a prescribed state of affairs, followed by an act of judgment, and
a corrective response (Binder & Weisberg, 2000). The official imposing a
sanction justifies it as authorized by a prior act of legislation. The legislator
defining the sanction justifies it as the path to a brighter future or the restoration
of a disrupted past. Both official and legislator claim authority on the basis of
prior acts of appointment or election.
Legal argument generally involves one of two forms of authorization narrative,
depending on where the speaker locates the current dispute along the narrative arc
between equilibrium disrupted and equilibrium restored. Archaelogical argument
locates the disruptive crisis in the past. Thus, applicable legal norms have emerged
from the authoritative settlement of that conflict. The current dispute is an echo
of that earlier conflict and has, in effect already been settled. To decide otherwise
is to reopen that conflict and reproduce the problems the applicable legal norm
earlier solved. Teleological argument locates the disruptive crisis in the present.
Thus, the current dispute results from a defective normative order, in which the
needs of some are unmet or the goals of all are unrealized. The applicable legal
norm will achieve the needed change. Archaeological argument predominates in
litigation and teleological argument predominates in legislation. But many legal
arguments combine both archaeological and teleological elements. Thus, the
current dispute is governed by an earlier normative settlement that promulgated a
collective goal as yet unachieved. Both teleological and archaeological narratives
derive authority from a collective will that must be constructed in the act of
representation.
Teleological representation involves prospective reasoning about the public
interest or the social welfare. Such teleological representation involves imagining
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and comparing the future histories of alternative hypothetical societies, each with
not only different legal regimes, but also different populations with different
values and interests. When different societies have different histories and
institutional structures, they are likely to make available quite disparate social
identities and roles to their members. These disparate identities and roles will
encourage members of differently constituted societies to pursue different
purposes and interests.
When we try to compare societies with different members, values, and interests
from the standpoint of social welfare we face imponderables. Should you prefer a
wealthier society in which you had a different family or personality? Should you
prefer a more peaceful society in which you did not exist? The choice among such
incommensurable alternatives is not the simple matter of calculating which future
will be better for people because the alternatives are populated by different people.
Such a decision requires us to choose among the different personal, group,
institutional, and societal identities that will shape the preferences of future
generations. We cannot hold their future preferences fixed and choose policies
that will best realize them. Instead, the design of the future society, its
membership, and its values is a necessarily expressive or aesthetic choice for us
(Parfit, 1984; Binder, 2001).
We face further value choices in reasoning about the future welfare of society.
We must choose distributive standards both within and across generations. We
must choose a time horizon: the future is infinite, our knowledge of it finite and
diminishing (Herzog, 1985). We must choose how to compare aggregate and
average utility (Parfit, 1984). We must choose a geographic scope: Is each
government responsible only for the welfare of the population in its territory?
Even if its decisions may affect immigration and emigration? (Binder, 1993a). All
these choices about how best to aggregate and compare subjectivity are
themselves subjective. We cannot simply enact the preferences of future people,
because we must decide which future people to consult, and what preferences they
will have. These decisions inevitably depend on our value choices, not those of
the future people whose welfare we would serve. Indeed, our value choices about
future welfare are likely to be interpretive responses to the identities, roles, and
traditions we have inherited from the past (Fish, 1989; Gadamer, 1975). We
express ourselves in making these choices. We fashion a design for the future that
is our best vision of how to continue a historical narrative in which we find
ourselves (MacIntyre, 1985; Dworkin, 1986).
The inevitable discretion we have to shape the future preferences we would
satisfy prevents teleological representation from achieving mimesis. From the
standpoint of modernist criticism, teleological representation therefore seems
illegitimate. In the face of the subjective, expressive, and arguably aesthetic value
choices entailed in prospective policy making, it is tempting to revert to some
form of archaeological representation.
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Archaeological representation consists in retrospective reasoning about indicia
of societal consent. The difficulty is that notions like popular consent are
incoherent and instable without authoritative institutional definition, and the
institutions defining popular consent can ultimately find no warrant in popular
consent. Institutional authority depends upon legitimating narratives, which make
a persuasive appeal for a performative response (Lyotard, 1984). To judge the
persuasiveness of these legitimating narratives, we must make expressive and
aesthetic choices. Just as prospective reasoning about future welfare implicates
aesthetic judgment, so does retrospective reasoning about past acts of consent.
Thus, when legal decisionmakers represent society’s will, they again face a
number of discretionary choices. First they must decide to what extent they are
going to represent society as a single democratic decisionmaker, and to what
extent they will represent society as a collection of individual transactors (Binder
& Weisberg, 1997). In other words, we can think of the tension between
majoritarian democracy and individual liberty, or between political allocation and
market allocation, as an aesthetic dilemma, a problem of representation. Each of
these forms of representation reconciles conflicting preferences in a different way,
and by assigning different decisions to different institutions we can represent the
same individuals quite differently. Within each of these modes of representation
there are further dilemmas, reflecting the indeterminacy of the ideals of
majoritarian democracy, individual liberty, and allocative efficiency. The
indeterminacy of these three ideals in turn reflects the opacity of the
corresponding institutions of elections, legal rights, and market exchange as
media for representing consent.
Majoritarian democracy is the conception of consent represented by the
institution of elections. Yet as an ideal, majoritarian democracy is afflicted with
the familiar problem of social choice. According to Arrow’s classic
demonstration, no social choice mechanism can aggregate fixed individual
preference orderings of more than two alternatives into a coherent social
preference ordering. A coherent social preference ordering therefore requires that
individual preferences vary with and depend on the institution aggregating them
into a collective choice (Arrow, 1963). The practical point of Arrow’s voting
paradox is not that indeterminacy is possible with three alternatives or more, but
that indeterminacy is almost inevitable when the number of alternatives becomes
very great. Democratic electorates must choose among an infinitely large set of
alternative possible futures. If they do so through pairwise comparisons, the
results are likely to depend on the order of comparison. If they try to compare all
alternatives at once, different schemes for weighting preferences will yield
different results (Mackie, 2003). In sum, the choice of voting procedures proves
more important than voting in determining electoral choices. There is no simple
fact of the matter about collective preferences for the institution of democracy to
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represent. The figurative replacement of individual preferences by majority will
is one type of reconciliation narrative.
As a conception of consent, majoritarian democracy is also necessarily
incomplete. It depends on some set of procedural conditions designed to guarantee
free and equal participation – universal suffrage, secret ballots, freedom of speech
and press, and so on. These procedural conditions set limits to the power of
democratic majorities to legislate: they cannot disfranchise, exile, enslave or
exterminate minorities, for example, without destroying the conditions for
majoritarian democracy. Majoritarian democracy is therefore a self-limiting ideal,
requiring a supplementary scheme of individual rights (Holmes, 1995).
Individual liberty is the conception of consent represented by the institution of
legal rights, supervised by the institution of courts. Liberty offers an alternative to
majoritarian democracy as an organization of consent. If political processes
cannot yield demonstrably legitimate choices, it is tempting to decrease the scope
of political decisionmaking as much as possible, and increase the scope for
individual decisionmaking. Thus the classical liberal thought popular among
American and German lawyers of the mid- to late nineteenth century, attempted
to restrict the domain of collective choice by recognizing individuals as
autonomous within a sphere of purely self-regarding action. Individuals, it was
said, were free to act as long as their actions imposed no harm on others. Classical
liberals assumed that society was so designed that individuals had a wide scope
within which they could act without effecting others, and reasoned that neither the
state nor other individuals should interfere with such purely self-regarding action
(Gordon, 1983; Singer, 1982). This vision of an atomistic society rested on a
conception of property rights as relations between persons and things, and of the
objects of property rights as environments – physical spaces paradigmatically –
within which individuals could act without affecting one another (Binder, 2002).
Yet such American legal realists as John Wesley Hohfeld and Walter Wheeler
Cook argued persuasively that purely self-regarding action is a chimera. To use a
resource is to interfere with rival potential uses, and to recognize a right of
autonomy on the part of one person is to impose a duty of non-interference on the
part of others. This analysis demonstrated that a property right was a social
relation and that the object of property was always an arena of social interaction
and conflict, rather than a peaceful private retreat (Cook, 1918; Cohen, 1927;
Hohfeld, 1913; Coase, 1960; Singer, 1982). This meant in turn that the problem
of collective choice cannot be solved simply by disaggregating it into a series of
individual choices. Any such strategy depends on a social decision to distribute to
individuals the right to exclude all others from access to certain resources. The
ideal of individual liberty depends on the figurative replacement of conflicting
desires with an authoritative allocation of rights. In short it depends upon the
reconciliation of conflicting claims of justice, perhaps by a court. The need for
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such an allocation of rights simply moves the problem of social choice back to an
earlier stage.
Like the ideal of majoritarian democracy, the ideal of individual liberty is selflimiting. Some sort of politics must limit each person’s liberty, to insure the equal,
or at least minimally adequate liberty of others. And just as the unrestricted
exercise of majoritarian democracy today may destroy the conditions for its
exercise tomorrow, the unrestricted exercise of individual liberty in the present
may waste the requisites of individual liberty in the future. Individuals may sell
or indebt themselves into slavery, addict themselves to dangerous products, or
enthrall themselves to exploitative creeds. To institutionalize individual liberty,
society must make a political choice about how much paternalistic protection it
will provide individuals.
Allocative efficiency is the conception of consent represented by the institution
of market exchange. It offers a representation of desire that is collective, and yet
not aggregative. In this way, it promises to resolve some questions of resource
allocation in a way that responds to individual preferences, while avoiding the
paradoxes of social choice theory. By hypothesis, when a resource is exchanged
it is moved to a use that is more valuable socially, but without any social
decisionmaker aggregating the utilities of the transacting parties. Assuming that a
transaction is uncoerced, it should make both parties at least marginally better off.
And assuming there are no transaction costs, anyone else whose welfare is
decreased by the transaction can attempt to prevent it by bribing the parties forgo
it (Coase, 1960). So if unrestricted opportunities for costless transactions are
institutionalized, society should be able to constantly reallocate resources in ways
that increase the welfare of some without decreasing the welfare of any. Assuming
no transaction costs or coercion, market exchange should be able to allocate
resources optimally, regardless of their initial distribution. By means of the
reconciliation narrative of the invisible hand, individual desire is transformed into
collective utility without the need for politics. But like majoritarian democracy
and individual liberty, allocative efficiency is a necessarily incomplete
representation of aggregate desire.
First, efficiency depends on politics. While efficiency presumes the ideal of
costless transactions, all transactions involve the cost of enforcing promises and
defining and securing entitlements to the resources traded. These costly services
are typically provided by government without a fee. So the transactional model of
collective decisionmaking presupposes a political process of collective
decisionmaking to establish the institutions of property and contract within which
transactional decisions will take place (Barzel, 2002; North, 1990; Rose, 1989).
Second, efficiency depends upon individual liberty. If choices are coerced, we
cannot interpret them as welfare-maximizing revelations of preferences. And
since all market choices are constrained by the available goods, and the limitations
of the actor’s purchasing power, market choices are all coerced in varying degree
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(Crawford, 1997). Determining whether to deem a particular menu of options
excessively coercive requires a collective, political judgment.
Third, any claim that uncoerced, costless transactions are allocatively efficient
becomes circular, when combined with two premises of neo-classical economics:
the behaviorist methodological assumptions that satisfaction cannot be reliably
observed and that utility cannot be compared across persons (Robbins, 1938;
Samuelson, 1938; Samuelson, 1950; Friedman, 1953). On these assumptions
welfare must be defined behaviorally as the result of uncoerced, costless
transactions; yet there is no way to determine if an actual or possible transaction
meets these conditions without knowing its welfare effects. Economists recognize
no independent measure of welfare by which they can determine whether coercion
has caused, or transaction costs have prevented any particular transaction.
Just as an election cannot register each voter’s preferences for all possible
futures, a market cannot register each consumer’s preferences for all possible
goods and services. Consumers can only spend wealth they have, and only on the
particular goods and services producers provide. Like electoral institutions and
property, markets construct an arena for the exercise of choice and thereby create
a medium for expressing desires choosers might not otherwise have (Anderson,
1993; Walzer, 1983).
Finally, like the ideals of majoritarian democracy and individual liberty, the
ideal of allocative efficiency is self-limiting. Like voting and the exercise of
property rights, market exchange can destroy its own institutional conditions. If
individuals can sell themselves, or trade away the requisites of participation in
market exchange, their preferences will no longer influence market allocation.
The unrestricted transacting required for efficient allocation is a procedural
impossibility. Politics must create and define markets, as well as spheres of
individual liberty.
We have seen that each of the idioms for representing consent – majoritarian
democracy, individual liberty, and allocative efficiency – is an opaque medium.
Thus, each medium of archaeological representation constructs the consent that it
represents. But when legal decisionmakers represent societal will they must not
only choose within each idiom, they must also choose among them. In designing
the institutions of electoral politics, individual rights, and market exchange, legal
decisionmakers are not only influencing the particular goals and policies to which
members of society consent, they are also shaping the forms of consent –
democracy, liberty, or efficiency – made available to them. The design of a mix
of institutions for registering consent is itself a social or political choice that
cannot be justified by consent alone, without an infinite regress.
But if neither future social welfare nor past consent can legitimate legal
institutions what can? Such institutions can only be rendered authoritative by
means of a legitimating narrative. Legitimation narratives present particular legal
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being. They make a performative appeal, inviting an audience to identify itself
with a particular institutional medium for representing desire. Such legitimating
narratives are a necessary part of legal argument, because without them, legal
argument cannot warrant particular archaeological and teleological
representations of societal will as authoritative. A narrative of virtuous
institutional origins is needed to cope with two related problems of liberal political
theory, the problem of collective action and the problem of political obligation.
The collective action problem arises among individuals who are rationally selfinterested, uncoerced, and well-informed. Such persons have no incentive to
cooperate in producing or conserving public goods such as renewable resources,
common defense, or security of entitlements. By defecting, they can receive the
benefits of the public good without bearing the costs of its provision. Hence all
will find it rational to defect, with the perverse result that none will enjoy the
public good (Olson, 1965). And so, the argument concludes, government is
needed to coerce free riders into cooperating to produce public goods. Convinced
by the security of government enforcement that one’s fellow citizens will
cooperate in the provision of public goods, each citizen will ungrudgingly
cooperate in turn.
But this willingness depends upon each citizen’s faith in the stability,
effectiveness, and civic responsibility of the institutions charged with enforcing
cooperation. And rational self-interest maximizers will be very skeptical of
promises to establish a stable and effective rule of law. For such a government is
itself a public good requiring cooperation to establish. So government arguably
could never come into existence among people who were uncoerced, rationally
self-interested, and well-informed, even if they desired it (Rose, 1989).
The existence of an effective liberal government therefore presupposes a prior
history involving coercion, altruism, or myth. Coercion can play at least two roles
in establishing liberal government. A liberal government can arise as a result of
the internal reform of an authoritarian state or as a result of a violent revolution,
establishing military rule before building liberal institutions. Yet a revolutionary
movement is also an irrationally cooperative enterprise that must be explained in
terms of coercion, altruism or myth. By altruism, I mean a disposition to cooperate
regardless of the defection of free riders. Altruism can play a role in establishing
effective government when tribal, religious or ideological solidarity becomes a
basis for civic loyalty. By myth I mean faith that others will cooperate in obeying
and defending government when this has not been proven by experience.
Typically, myth takes the form of an invented past characterized by heroic
altruism, solidaristic cooperation, and virtuous government. A myth of national
origin can support a solidaristic ideology (Binder & Weisberg, 2000; Anderson,
1983; Gellner, 1983). Historically speaking, modern liberal states arise through a
combination of these processes, rather than through uncoerced contracting among
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interested individuals unencumbered by solidaristic commitments or authoritarian
beliefs except in a liberal state. Rationality can only be the product of liberal
institutions, not their source.
In addition to solving the collective action problem, a mythic narrative of a
heroic founding can solve a related problem, that of political obligation. This
problem arises in consent theories of political legitimacy. If government derives
its legitimacy only from the consent of the governed, it is not clear why its citizens
should comply with laws they do not personally agree to. Nor is it clear why
anyone born into such a society (rather than joining it voluntarily) should respect
its laws. Revolutionary origins symbolize the moral basis of many modern states
in the consent of the governed, yet they also illustrate the fragility of such a
foundation. Every legal system must account for its origins in an act of
transgression against a preexisting legal order (Cover, 1983). So a state’s
revolutionary origin poses the problem of political obligation, unless it provides
some additional basis of legitimacy beyond consent. That is why a myth of
revolutionary heroism is particular important: a reputation for extraordinary virtue
is needed to explain why the founding generation had a right to revolt, but their
successors do not.
The liberal state cannot induce cooperation and provide public goods unless it
is stable. But it cannot promise stability if it holds that citizens are only bound to
obey law as long as they consent to do so. The disenchanted liberal individual,
loyal only to his own property, cannot by himself sustain the polity that protects
it. Thus the authority of the liberal state can never be explained by reference to
consent alone. To solve the problem of political obligation, the narrative
mythology of the liberal state must offer a reason why the consent of the founders
binds their successors. To distinguish the founding exercise of will from future
defections, it must be remembered as virtuous, motivated by altruism rather than
selfishness. The popular ‘‘consent’’ which legitimates new laws is not purely a
matter of will: it is a matter of keeping faith with virtues that a patriotic mythology
ascribes to a political founding. When we make law, we do not simply reveal
preference: we exercise the authority of office. Our consent can only authorize
law, if we have first characterized ourselves as authoritative, in an act of literary
imagination (Vining, 1988; Derrida, 1986).
Thus the claim that a legal system makes to legitimacy is not simply a claim
about ethics, or about political fact. It is a performative appeal that offers each
citizen recognition as a member of a particular political community. It must offer
not only just and efficacious institutions, but an identity which each citizen will
perceive as appealing to all, and so which may plausibly promise to bind each
citizen to those institutions. It demands of each citizen a performative response,
identifying with a political community and thereby recognizing other citizens as
members. To thus identify herself with a political community and its other
members, is to make an expressive choice (Ankersmit, 1996). And such an
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expressive choice depends on at least two kinds of judgment that can fairly be
characterized as aesthetic. First, in choosing an identity for herself and others she
chooses purposes. Second, in choosing an identity to share with others, she must
interpret a collective project. Such judgments are too subjective and historically
contingent to count as moral, yet they are aimed at selfconstitution rather than
merely self-gratification.

4.
CONCLUSION: THE AESTHETIC PREDICAMENT OF
LEGAL CRITICISM
In liberal states legal arguments depend on representations of human will, taking
the form of judgments about future social welfare or past popular consent. Yet
these representations are not simply mimetic, because social welfare and popular
will are constituted in the very act of representing them. The process by which we
represent our society’s will and welfare in the medium of law is an imaginative
and expressive one, narrating the path from a virtuous past to a decent future, and
informed by aesthetic judgment as well as instrumental reason. In so far as law
involves the presentation of rhetoric for aesthetic judgment it is a literary practice.
Recognizing the constitutively aesthetic basis of legal justification in the liberal
state should induce us to revise the practice of modernist criticism of law. Much
contemporary critical scholarship accepts the modernist premise that law should
mirror the desires of society’s members and takes law to task for failing to do so
with perfect accuracy. Such mimetic criticism is subject to two pathologies:
skepticism and sentimentalism
Skepticism is the disposition to see every practice as illegitimate unless it can
be shown to rest on some indubitable foundation independent of the practice
(Binder & Weisberg, 2000). Mimetic criticism becomes skeptical when it tries,
and fails, to turn societal will into such a foundation for law. The skeptical form
of mimetic criticism tends to begin with the proposition that political
representation always involves an agency problem, a potential conflict between
the interests of the represented and the interests of those who represent them.
Accordingly, skeptical criticism deems representation legitimate only if the
medium of representation is transparent: that is, only if it can simply copy the
represented, without involving any discretionary choices. But as we have seen,
political representation cannot be transparent in this sense. The teleological
representation of welfare and the archaeological representation of consent are
both inevitably discretionary acts of imaginative construction.
Mimetic critics tend to treat each of the paradoxes and limitations of
majoritarian democracy, individual liberty, and allocative efficiency separately.
Thus, one points to the problems of social choice theory in arguing that we can
represent society more accurately by shifting decisionmaking authority from state
to market (Riker, 1982; Riker & Ordeshook, 1973). Or, one points to the legal
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rights problem, and the indeterminacy of allocative efficiency in arguing that we
can represent society more accurately in shifting decisionmaking authority from
individuals and markets to the state (Sunstein, 1986). Each argument is based on
the fallacious premise that a more accurate, less discretionary, depiction of society
is possible, or even desirable. The mimetic critic appears to be saying something
constructive about which institutions should have the leading role in governing
society, but he is merely bearing witness to the opacity inherent in any institutional
representation of society.
Skeptical variants of mimetic criticism recognize the opacity of both state and
market as representative institutions, but nevertheless insist that legitimate law
must stand on a foundation of actual consent, warranted by law’s mimetic
resemblance to society. Skeptical criticism reasons that since law must be a
transparent medium of representation, and legal decisionmakers necessarily have
discretion as to how they represent society, these decisionmakers rule society
rather than taking instruction from society (Tushnet, 1988; Levinson, 1988). One
response to this skeptical conclusion is a flight to the formalist ideal of the rule of
law. According to this view, law must constrain legal decisionmakers with rules,
to prevent them from ruling oppressively. The skeptic will likely respond that
since any such scheme of rules is subject to discretionary interpretation, no such
scheme can prevent the oppressive exercise of discretion (Tushnet, 1988). But
rule formalism has also provoked a second and equally pathological form of
mimetic criticism: sentimentalist criticism.
Sentimentality is the experience of pleasure in emotion. By sentimentalism I
mean a sanctimonious insistence on insulating this pleasure from the threat of
critical reflection (Binder & Weisberg, 2000). Mimetic criticism becomes
sentimentalist when it venerates individual or group subjectivity as the occasion
for sentimental experience, and so tries to protect it from the representative
mediation necessary to any institutional order. Sentimental criticism of law argues
that formal rules designed to constrain official discretion are arbitrary and
inflexible. The result is that decision according to rule will not yield outcomes the
represented would choose. It follows that such legal rules cannot express the true
subjectivity of those whom law represents, and the rule of law therefore demeans
those subject to it (Abrams, 1991; Getman, 1988; Weisberg, 1984, 1992; White,
1990). The sentimentalist complaint is not that the rule of law oppresses, but that
it fails to recognize, express, and empathize with the personality of the legal
subject. The demand is not that law should construct some serviceable
representation of the will of those subject to it, but that it should represent their
authentic feelings and identities.
But the demand that law represent its subject authentically misunderstands what
political representation is. It is not an effort to copy a preexisting fact about the
public good, but an effort to construct the public good. At an early stage in the
development of the liberal state, Hegel offered an analysis of the problem of
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legitimacy as a challenge to universalize recognition and civic dignity in a
dynamically competitive economic environment. Hegel saw that recognition in a
dynamic society had to be dialectical rather than mimetic. The state had to enable
the citizen’s self-conscious transformation and development rather than preserve
the conditions for a static identity. For example, to enable the individual to
participate in the dignity of collective self-governance, the liberal state had to
encourage cooperation by fostering the institutions of civil society (Hegel, 1942;
Binder, 1993b).
Both skeptical and sentimental variants of mimetic criticism set unrealistically
high standards of accuracy and fidelity in representation. Skeptical criticism
demands that knowledge of social will rest on indubitable epistemological
foundations, even though pragmatism demands only that beliefs be justified by
comparing their consequences to those of available alternatives. Sentimental
criticism demands that representations capture the full particularity and intrinsic
worth of each individual, even when reductive generalization may serve as a
useful tool of practical reason. Sentimental criticism requires that law treat its
subjects with all the tenderness and insight appropriate to an intimate
interpersonal relationship, providing a kind of civic substitute for love.
Yet law has the more modest ambitions of keeping the peace and organizing
collective action. And if it is to realize these more prosaic ambitions, law will
inevitably require institutions with arbitrary decisionmaking procedures and
coercive power, a division of labor with attendant agency problems, and tradeoffs among competing values. In particular, representative democracy, contract,
some sort of property, and the rule of law have all proven themselves necessary
components of productive, peaceful, and politically responsive societies.
Skeptical and sentimental criticisms do not offer practical alternatives to the
institutions they criticize. This suggests that from the pragmatic standpoint,
aesthetic standards such as social decency are more germane in evaluating law
than mimetic standards such as representative accuracy or faithful agency (Binder,
2001).
Mimetic criticism is useless to normative practice because it searches
obsessively for a foundation that cannot possibly exist. Mimetic criticism
misconceives the nature of law’s representation of society. As we have seen, there
is no fixed fact of the matter about individual subjectivity that law can represent
in the process of organizing collective action. The individual preferences
measured, aggregated, and represented by institutions such as elections and
markets are endogenous to those institutions. Individual preferences depend on
the social settings for the development and expression of choice. Collective
preferences depend on the methods by which institutions identify them. The
current freedom of individuals and collectivities to choose is at odds with their
future freedom, and the future welfare of society depends on how we choose to
constitute that society and measure its will. In sum, individual and societal will
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and welfare are not facts which exist independent of law. Legal concepts such as
public interest, contractual consent, and legislative intent are institutional
constructs, not independent facts about society. This means that the mimetic
conception of law’s representation of society is premised on a fallacy. Apart from
law, society has no determinate features for law to represent.
Because law does not – and cannot – mimic the will of society or of legal actors,
critical scholarship about law should no longer be organized by a mimetic
conception of law. Mimetic criticism should be replaced by aesthetic criticism,
premised on a pragmatist model of justification and an institutionalist conception
of law. Such aesthetic criticism presumes that law ascribes intentions and
preferences, conditions choice, and organizes institutional settings for the
discursive development of interests and goals. This means that law represents
legal persons in something like the way a novel represents characters, and law
represents legal interests and values the way a novel represents themes.
Aesthetic criticism sees law as an arena of cultural contestation and tries to
understand it from the standpoint of legal actors for whom it is an expressive as
well as a strategic practice. Thus, the strategic interests legal actors pursue are
given by identities and roles – which are shaped in part by law. In particular, the
legal activities of disputing, transacting, and decisionmaking provide
opportunities to claim, perform, and define identities and roles. In so doing actors
reproduce and reshape the law and thereby affect the expressive resources
available to themselves and others. Aesthetic criticism must recognize that our
legal institutions, our social identities and our individual interests are mutually
constitutive elements of culture. It is this entire culture that is the proper object of
critique, not legal institutions taken in isolation. In helping to fashion such a
culture, law of course influences the interests we will define and pursue. But
perhaps more importantly, law helps determine our identities and most
fundamental values (Binder & Weisberg, 1997). In evaluating alternative futures,
we should be more concerned with what passions will fire our souls, than with
how efficiently society will gratify those passions.
To evaluate, critique, and improve law, we must give up the comforting
assumption that there is any fact of the matter about society’s purposes for law to
replicate. Society constructs its purposes along with its institutional organization.
The choices society must make in thus creating itself are aesthetic choices. In a
democratic polity, these choices must be made reflectively, as a result of a public
discourse of aesthetic criticism.
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